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Abstract
We consider multi-player games played on graphs, in which the players aim at fulfilling their own
(not necessarily antagonistic) objectives. In the spirit of evolutionary game theory, we suppose that
the players have the right to repeatedly update their respective strategies (for instance, to improve
the outcome w.r.t. the current strategy profile). This generates a dynamics in the game which may
eventually stabilise to an equilibrium. The objective of the present paper is twofold. First, we aim
at drawing a general framework to reason about the termination of such dynamics. In particular, we
identify preorders on games (inspired from the classical notion of simulation between transitions
systems, and from the notion of graph minor) which preserve termination of dynamics. Second, we
show the applicability of the previously developed framework to interdomain routing problems.
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1 Introduction
Games are nowadays a well-established model to reason about several problems in computer
science. In the game paradigm, several agents (called players) are assumed to be rational, and
interact in order to reach a fixed objective. As such, games have found numerous applications,
such as controller synthesis [14, 17] or network protocols [12]. In this paper, we are mainly
concerned about multi-player games played on graphs, in which n ≥ 2 players interact trying
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to fulfil their own objectives (which are not necessarily antagonistic to the others); and where
the arena (defining the possible actions of the players) is given as a finite graph.
An example of such game is given in Figure 1, modelling an instance of an interdomain
routing problem which is typical of the Internet. In this case, two service providers v1 and
v2 want to route packets to a target node v⊥ through the links that are represented by
the graph edges. For economical reasons, v1 prefers to route the traffic to v⊥ through v2
(using path c1s2) instead of sending them directly to v⊥, and symmetrically for v2. (Assume
for instance that both v1 and v2 are located in Europe, and that v⊥ is in America. Then,
s1 and s2 are transatlantic links that incur a huge cost of operation for the origin nodes.)
Then, assume that, initially, v1 and v2 route the packets through s1 and s2 respectively, and
broadcast this information through the network. When v1 becomes aware of the choice of
v2, he could decide to rely on the c1 link instead, trying to route his packets through v2.
However, due to the asynchronous nature of the network, v2 could decide to route through
c2 before the new choice of v1 reaches it. Hence, the packets get blocked in a cycle c1c2c1 · · ·
and do not reach v⊥ anymore. Then, v1 and v2 could decide simultaneously to reverse to s1
and s2 respectively which brings the network to its initial state, where the same behaviour
can start again. Clearly, such oscillations in the routing policies must be avoided.
This simple example illustrates the main notions we will consider in the paper. We
study the notion of dynamics in games, which model the behaviour of the players when
they repeatedly update their strategy (i.e. their choices of actions) in order to achieve a
better outcome. Then, the main objectives of the paper are to draw a general framework to
reason about the termination of such dynamics and to show its applicability to interdomain
routing problems (as sketched above). We say that a dynamics terminates when the players
converge to an equilibrium, i.e. a state in which they have no incentive to further update their
respective strategies. Our framework is introduced in Section 3 and 4. It relies on notions
of preorders, in particular the simulation preorder [11]. Simulations are usually defined on
transition systems: intuitively, a system A simulates a system B if each step of B can be
mimicked in A. We consider two kinds of preorders: preorders defined on game graphs, i.e.
on the structure of the games; and simulation defined on the dynamics, which are useful
to reason about termination (indeed, if a dynamics D1 simulates a dynamics D2, and if D1
terminates, then D2 terminates as well). We show how the existence of a relation between
game graphs implies the existence of a simulation between the induced dynamics of those
games (Theorem 8, Theorem 9). This technique allows us to check the termination of the
dynamics using structural criteria about the game graph.
The motivation of this framework comes from several examples of problems in the
literature [7, 15, 9, 2] that are (sometimes implicitly) reduced to checking the termination
of a dynamics in a multi-player game, and where sufficient criteria are proposed that can
be expressed as the existence of a preorder between game graphs. We thus seek to unify
these results, hoping that our framework will foster new applications of the game model.
For instance, several sufficient conditions for termination in the network problem sketched
above consist in checking that the game graph does not contain a forbidden pattern [7]. This
containment can naturally be expressed as a preorder.
To this aim, we introduce, in Section 4 a preorder relation on game graphs, which is
inspired from the classical notion of graph minor [10]. Intuitively, a game graph G′ is a
minor of G if G′ can be obtained by deleting edges and vertices from G (under well-chosen
conditions that are compatible with the game setting). Then, the relation ‘is a minor of’
forms a preorder relation on game graphs and allows one to reason on the termination of
dynamics (see Theorem 8 and Theorem 9).
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Finally, in Section 5, we achieve our second objective, by casting questions about Interdo-
main Routing into our framework. Interdomain Routing is the process of constructing routes
across the networks that compose the Internet. The Border Gateway Protocol (BGP), is the
de facto standard interdomain routing protocol. As sketched in the example above, it grows
a routing tree towards every destination network in a distributed manner. The example also
shows that the behaviour of the BGP is naturally modelled as a game, as already pointed out
before (see [5, 15] for example). In particular, checking for so-called safety (does the protocol
always converge to a stable state?) amounts to checking termination of some dynamics. In
Section 5, we formally express BGP in our game model; revisit a classical result of Sami et
al. that we re-prove within our framework; and finally obtain a new result regarding BGP:
we provide a novel necessary and sufficient condition for convergence in the restricted (yet
realistic) setting where the preferences of the nodes range on the next-hop in the route only.
Due to space constraints, full proofs and some examples can be found in Appendix.
2 Preliminaries
Graphs. A (directed) graph is a pair G = (V,E) where V is a set of states (or nodes),
E ⊆ V × V is the set of edges. A labelled graph is a tuple G = (V,E, L) where (V,E) is a
graph, and L : E → S is a function associating, to each edge e, a label L(e) from a set S of
labels. A (labelled) graph G is finite iff V is finite. A path in a (labelled) graph G is a finite
sequence v1v2 · · · vk or an infinite sequence v1v2 · · · vi · · · of states such that (vi, vi+1) ∈ E
for all i. We denote v1, the first state of a path pi, by first(pi). When pi = v1v2 · · · vk is finite,
we let last(pi) = vk. We let V⊥ = {v ∈ V | there is no v′ : (v, v′) ∈ E} be the set of terminal
states. We say that a path pi is maximal iff: either pi is infinite, or pi is finite and last(pi) ∈ V⊥.
Let pi1 = v1 · · · vk and pi2 = u1u2 · · · be two paths such that (vk, u1) ∈ E. Then, we write
pi1pi2 to denote the new path v1 · · · vku1u2 · · · , obtained by the concatenation of pi1 and pi2.
Following automata terminologies, a labelled graph G is said to be complete deterministic
if for every state v and label `, there is exactly one edge (v, v′) s.t. L(v, v′) = `.
Games played on graphs. An n-player game is a tuple G = (V,E, (Vi)1≤i≤n, (i)1≤i≤n)
where players are denoted by 1, . . . , n and: (V,E) is a finite graph which forms the arena of
the game, with V⊥ the terminal states; (Vi)1≤i≤n is a partition of V \ V⊥ indicating which
player owns each (non-terminal) state of the game (v belongs to player i iff v ∈ Vi); and
i describes the preference of player i as a reflexive, transitive and total (i.e. for all pi, pi′,
pi i pi′ or pi′ i pi) binary relation defined on maximal paths which we call plays (the set of
all plays being denoted by Play). Intuitively, player i prefers play pi to play pi′ iff pi′ i pi. We
can extract from i a strict partial order relation by letting pi ≺i pi′ if player i strictly prefers
play pi′ to play pi, i.e. if pi i pi′ and pi′ 6i pi. We also write pi ∼i pi′ if pi i pi′ and pi′ i pi,
and say that pi and pi′ are equivalent for player i. From now on, we describe preferences by
mentioning plays of interest only (implicitly, all unmentioned plays are equivalent, and below
in the preference order). We also abuse notations and identify a game with its arena: so, we
can write, for instance, about the ‘paths of G’, meaning the paths of the underlying arena.
I Example 1. Consider the example of [7]. In our context, it is modelled with the 2-player
game GDIS = (V,E, (V1, V2), (1,2)) depicted on the left of Figure 1. The state v⊥ is
terminal. Player 1 owns V1 = {v1}, and player 2 owns V2 = {v2}. Let E = {c1, s1, c2, s2} be
such that si = (vi, v⊥) and c1 = (v1, v2), c2 = (v2, v1). Edges ci stand for ‘continue’, and
edges si stand for ‘stop’. For player 1, we let the preferences be (v1v2)ω ≺1 v1v⊥ ≺1 v1v2v⊥,
where piω denotes an infinite number of iterations of the cycle pi. Symmetrically, player 2
FSTTCS 2019
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v1 v2
v⊥
c1
c2
s1 s2
c1c2 s1c2
c1s2 s1s2
c1c2 s1c2
c1s2 s1s2
Figure 1 Left: a 2-player game GDIS . Middle: GDIS〈 P1−→〉. Right: GDIS〈 PC−→〉
has preferences (v2v1)ω ≺2 v2v⊥ ≺2 v2v1v⊥. In this case, all unmentioned plays are equally
worse for both players, in particular the plays that do not start in the state owned by the
player (this will always be the case in the routing application of Section 5).
Strategies and strategy profiles. The game is played by letting players move a token along
the edges of the arena. Note that, in our games, there is no designated initial state, so the
play can start in any state v. The choice of the initial state is not under the control of any
player. Then, the player who owns v picks an edge (v, w) and moves the token to w. It is
then the turn of the player who owns w to choose an edge (w, u) and so forth. The game
continues ad infinitum or until a terminal node has been reached, thereby forming a play. Of
course, each player will act in order to yield a play that is best according to his preference
order ≺i. Since no player controls the choice of the initial vertex, the players will seek to
obtain the best path considering any possible initial vertex (see the formal definitions below).
This will be important for the application of Interdomain Routing in Section 5, where the
games are networks and each state corresponds to a network node that wants to send a
packet to one of the terminal states.
Formally, a non-maximal path is called a history in the following, and the set of all
histories is denoted by Hist. We let Histi be the set of histories h such that last(h) ∈ Vi,
i.e. h ends in a state that belongs to player i. We further let player(h) = i iff h ∈ Histi.
The way players behave in the game is captured by the central notion of strategy, which
is a mapping from a history h to a successor state in the graph, indicating how the player
will play from h. A player i strategy is thus a function σi : Histi → V such that, for all
h ∈ Histi, (last(h), σi(h)) ∈ E. A strategy profile σ is a tuple (σi)1≤i≤n of strategies, one for
each player i. In the following, when we consider a strategy profile σ, we always assume
that σi is the corresponding strategy of player i. We also abuse notations, and write σ(h) to
denote the node obtained by playing the relevant strategy of σ from h, i.e. σ(h) = σi(h) with
i = player(h). We denote by Σi(G) and Σ(G) the sets of player i strategies and of strategy
profiles respectively (if the game G is clear from the context, we may drop it and write Σ and
Σi). As usual, given a strategy profile σ = (σi)1≤i≤n and a strategy σ′j for some player j, we
denote by (σ−j , σ′j) the strategy profile obtained from σ by replacing the player j strategy
σj with σ′j . Fixing a history h (or, in particular, an initial node) and a profile of strategies σ
is sufficient to determine a unique play that is called the outcome: we let Outcome (σ, h) be
the (unique) play hv1v2 · · · such that for all i ≥ 1: vi = σ(hv1 · · · vi−1).
Of particular interest are the positional strategies (sometimes called memoryless), i.e. the
set of strategies such that the action of the player depends on the last state of the history only.
That is, σi is positional iff for all pairs of histories h1 and h2 in Histi: last(h1) = last(h2)
implies σi(h1) = σi(h2). For a positional strategy profile σ, and a state v ∈ V , we write
σ(v) to denote the (unique) state σ(h) returned by σ for all h with last(h) = v. We denote
by ΣP(G) the set of strategy profiles composed of positional strategies only, and by ΣPi (G)
the set of player i positional strategies. From all states v, applying a positional strategy
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profile builds a play such that the very same decision is always taken at a particular state:
therefore, it either creates a finite path without cycles, or a lasso (infinite path that starts
with a finite path without cycle and continues with an infinite simple cycle, disjoint from the
finite path). We let PlayP be the set of all positional plays thus generated. In a game where
we are only interested in positional strategies (as this will be the case in the application to
routing, for instance), the preferences need only be defined on positional plays. Indeed, all
other plays will never be obtained as an outcome, and can be assumed to be worse than any
other positional play.
Game Dynamics. Let us now turn our attention to the central notion of dynamics. Intuit-
ively, a dynamics consists in letting players update their strategies according to some criteria.
For example, a player will want to update his strategy in order to yield a better outcome
according to his preferences. Therefore, a dynamics can be understood as a graph whose
states are the strategy profiles and whose edges correspond to possible updates.
I Definition 2. Let G be a game. A dynamics for G is a binary relation → ⊆ Σ× Σ over
the strategy profiles of G. Its associated graph is G〈→〉 = (Σ,→), where Σ is the set of states.
The terminal profiles σ of G〈→〉 (without outgoing edges) are called the equilibria of →.
We will focus on five dynamics, modelling certain rational behaviours of the players:
The one-step dynamics 1−→. It corresponds to the minimal update that can occur, where
only one player changes a single decision in order to improve the outcome from his point
of view: σ 1−→ σ′ iff there is a player i ∈ {1, . . . , n} and a history h ∈ Histi such that
(i) σ(h) 6= σ′(h); (ii) Outcome (σ, h) ≺i Outcome (σ′, h); and (iii) σ(h′) = σ′(h′) for all
h′ 6= h. Note that the equilibria of the one-step dynamics are exactly the so-called
subgame perfect equilibria (SPE) introduced in [16] (see also [13]).
The positional one-step dynamics P1−→. It ranges over positional strategy profiles only,
and corresponds to a single player updating his strategy from a single state. Formally,
σ
P1−→ σ′ (with σ, σ′ ∈ ΣP) iff there are a player i ∈ {1, . . . , n} and a state v ∈ Vi s.t. (i)
σ(v) 6= σ′(v); (ii) Outcome (σ, v) ≺i Outcome (σ′, v); and (iii) σ(v′) = σ′(v′) for all v′ 6= v.
The best reply positional one-step dynamics bP1−−→. We let σ bP1−−→ σ′ iff there exists a player
i ∈ {1, . . . , n} and a state v ∈ Vi such that the three properties of the positional one-step
dynamics are satisfied, and, in addition, the following best-reply condition is satisfied:
(iv) for all σ′′ 6= σ′ such that σ P1−→ σ′′ if player i is the one that has changed its strategy
between σ and σ′′, then: Outcome (σ′′, v) i Outcome (σ′, v).
The positional concurrent dynamics PC−−→ and its best reply version bPC−−→. Several players
can update their strategies at the same time (in a ‘one step’ fashion), but each individual
update would yield a better play when performed independently (in some sense, each
player performing an update ‘believes’ he will improve). Formally, for σ, σ′ ∈ ΣP, we
let σ PC−−→ σ′ (respectively, σ bPC−−→ σ′) iff for all i ∈ P (σ, σ′), σ P1−→ (σ′i, σ−i) (respectively,
σ
bP1−−→ (σ′i, σ−i)).
Observe that other dynamics can be defined, corresponding to other behaviours of the
players. We focus on these five dynamics as they fit the applications we target in Section 5.
We have already said that the equilibria of 1−→ are SPEs, and we can also see from the
definitions that the equilibria of the four other dynamics coincide.
I Example 3. Let GDIS be the game from Example 1. The graphs GDIS〈 P1−→〉 and GDIS〈 PC−−→〉
are given in the middle and the right of Figure 1, where each strategy profile is represented
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by the choices of the players from v1 and v2. For example, c1c2 is the strategy profile s.t.
σ1(v1) = v2 and σ2(v2) = v1. Note that, in this example,
P1−→ = bP1−−→ and PC−−→ = bPC−−→.
Moreover, we can see that GDIS〈 P1−→〉 has no infinite paths, contrary to GDIS〈 PC−−→〉. We then
say that the dynamics P1−→ terminates on GDIS, while PC−−→ does not terminate on GDIS.
The main problem we study is whether a given dynamics terminates on a certain game:
we say that a dynamics → terminates on the game G if there is no infinite path in the graph
G〈→〉 of the dynamics. As illustrated in the introduction (Example 1), such infinite paths
may be problematic in certain applications, like in the Interdomain Routing problem, where
an infinite path in the dynamics means that the routing protocol does not stabilise. We are
thus interested in techniques to check whether a dynamics terminates on a given game.
Sometimes, a dynamics does not terminate in general, but does when we restrict ourselves
to fair executions where all players will eventually have the opportunity to update their
strategies if they want to. Formally, given a dynamics →, an infinite path σ1 → σ2 → · · ·
of the graph G〈→〉 is not fair if there exists a player i, and a position k such that for all
` ≥ k, player i can switch his strategy in σ` (i.e. there is σ` → σ′ where σ`i 6= σ′i), but for all
` ≥ k, player i keeps the same strategy forever (i.e. σ`i = σki ). We say that the dynamics →
fairly terminates for the game G if there are no infinite fair paths in the graph G〈→〉: this is
a weakening of the notion of termination seen before (see [1] for an example of a dynamics
that does not terminate but terminates fairly).
3 Simulations: preorders on the dynamics graphs
At this point of the paper, it is important to understand that a game is characterised by two
graphs: the game graph which gives its structure (see for example, Figure 1, left); and the
dynamics graph, which, given a fixed dynamics →, defines the semantics of the game as the
long-term behaviour of the players (Figure 1, middle and right). In the present section, we
study preorder relations on the dynamics graphs, relying on the classical notion of simulation
[11]. They are the key ingredients to reason about the termination of dynamics.
The domain of a binary relation R ⊆ A×B is the set of elements a ∈ A such that there
exists b ∈ B with (a, b) ∈ R. The co-domain or R is the set of elements b ∈ B such that
there exists a ∈ A with (a, b) ∈ R. We denote the domain of R by dom(R). The transitive
closure R+ of relation R is defined as (a, b) ∈ R+ iff there are a0 = a, a1, a2, . . . , an = b such
that for all i ∈ {0, 1, . . . , n− 1}, (ai, ai+1) ∈ R.
Partial simulations and simulations. We start with some weak version of the notion of
simulation, called partial simulation v. Intuitively, we say that a state u partially simulates
a state u′ (noted u′ v u) if for all successor states v′ of u′, the following holds: if v′ is in the
domain of the simulation, then there must be some state v simulating v′ such that v is a
successor of u. Formally, if G = (V,E) and G′ = (V ′, E′) are two graphs, a binary relation v
contained in V ′ × V is a partial simulation of G′ by G if: for all (u′, v′) ∈ E′ ∩ dom(v)2, for
all u ∈ V : u′ v u implies there is v ∈ V such that (u, v) ∈ E and v′ v v. Then, a simulation
v of G′ by G is a partial simulation of G′ by G s.t. dom(v) = V ′, i.e. all states of G′ are
simulated by some state of G. When a (partial) simulation v of G′ by G exists, we say that
G (partially) simulates G′. The following example highlights the difference between partial
simulations and simulations. Assume G with only one edge u → v and G′ with only two
edges u′ → v′1 and u′ → v′2. Then, the relation v s.t. u′ v u and v′1 v v (but v′2 6v v) is a
partial simulation (its domain is {u′, v′1} so it is not a problem that v′2 is not simulated) but
is not a simulation relation.
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Simulations between dynamics graphs help in showing termination properties, as shown
by the following folk result:
I Proposition 4. Let G1 and G2 be two games, →1 and →2 be two dynamics on G1 and G2
respectively. If G1〈→1〉 simulates G2〈→2〉 and the dynamics →1 terminates on G1, then the
dynamics →2 terminates on G2.
Bisimulations and transitive closure. We can define other preorder relations on dynamics
graphs. A bisimulation is a simulation v such that the inverse relation v−1 is also a simulation.
We say that G = (V,E) and G′ = (V ′, E′) are bisimilar when there is a bisimulation between
them. As a corollary of the previous proposition, if G1〈→1〉 and G2〈→2〉 are bisimilar, then
→1 terminates on G1 if and only if →2 terminates on G2.
For termination purposes, it is also perfectly fine to simulate a single step of G′ in several
steps of G for instance. The following proposition stems from Proposition 4 and mixes the
notions of transitive closures and partial simulations.
I Proposition 5. Let G1 and G2 be two games, →1 and →2 be dynamics on G1 and G2 resp.
If G1〈→+1 〉 simulates G2〈→2〉 and the dynamics →1 terminates on G1, then the dynamics
→2 terminates on G2.
If v is a partial simulation of G2〈→+2 〉 by G1〈→+1 〉, and the dynamics →1 terminates
on G1, then there are no paths in G2〈→2〉 that visit a state of dom(v) infinitely often.
4 Minors and domination: preorders on game graphs
Let us now introduce notions of preorders on game graphs. We introduce a new notion of graph
minor which consists in lifting the classical notion of graph minor to the context of n-player
games on graphs. To the best of our knowledge, this has not been done previously. This new
preorder on game graphs enables us to use in a simple context the results of Section 3 to reason
about termination of dynamics. Let us start with the formal definition. For that purpose,
we start by defining two transformations on game graphs. Let G = (V,E, (Vi)i, (i)i) be an
n-player game. Then we can modify it by applying either of the following transformations
that yields a game G′ = (V ′, E′, (V ′i )i, (′i)i).
Deletion of an edge (u, v) ∈ E. Then, V ′ = V , E′ = E \ {(u, v)}, (V ′i )i = (Vi)i and ′i is
s.t. pi1 ′i pi2 iff pi1 i pi2 and pi1, pi2 are both paths of G′.
Deletion of a state v ∈ Vj (for a certain player j). This can happen in two different ways:
1. either when v is isolated, i.e. when (u, v) 6∈ E and (v, u) 6∈ E for all u ∈ V . Then,
V ′ = V \ {v}, E′ = E, V ′i = Vi for all i 6= j, V ′j = Vj \ {v}, and (′i)i = (i)i.
2. or when v has a unique outgoing edge (v, v′) and all predecessors u of v (i.e. (u, v) ∈ E)
do not have v′ as a successor (i.e. (u, v′) /∈ E). In this case, we have V ′ = V \ {v},
V ′i = Vi for all i 6= j and V ′j = Vj \ {v}, E′ = (E ∩ (V ′ × V ′)) ∪ {(u, v′) | (u, v) ∈ E},
and pi′1 ′i pi′2 iff pi1 i pi2 where pi1 and pi2 are the plays of G obtained from pi′1 and pi′2
respectively, by replacing all occurrences of (u, v′) (for some u) by (u, v), (v, v′).
I Definition 6. Let G and G′ be two n-player games. Then, G′ is a minor of G if G′ can be
obtained from G by applying a sequence of edges and states deletions.
I Example 7. An example of minor is depicted in Figure 2. If the original preferences of the
player owning state v1 are v1v4v5v⊥ ≺ v1v3v⊥ ≺ v1v2v4v⊥ ≺ v1v2v4v5v⊥ (other plays being
equally worse for this player), then after the deletion of the edge (v4, v⊥), his preferences
FSTTCS 2019
35:8 Dynamics on Games: Simulation-Based Techniques and Applications to Routing
v1 v2
v3 v4
v⊥ v5
v1 v2
v3 v4
v⊥ v5
v1 v2
v3
v⊥ v5
v1 v2
v3
v⊥ v5
Figure 2 Minors obtained by first deleting the edge (v4, v⊥), then the state v4 (that has now a
unique successor v5), and then the edge (v1, v5)
v1 v2
v⊥v3
c1
c2s1 s2d
c1c2 s1c2 dc2
c1s2 s1s2 ds2
c1c2 s1c2 dc2
c1s2 s1s2 ds2
Figure 3 L: a 3-player game G with GDIS (Figure 1) as a minor. M: G〈 PC−→〉. R: G〈 bPC−−→〉
become v1v4v5v⊥ ≺ v1v3v⊥ ≺ v1v2v4v5v⊥ (the path v1v2v4v⊥ does not exist in the new
graph and has simply been removed from the preferences). Next, the deletion of v4 is allowed
because it is a single outgoing edge v5, and neither v1 nor v2 nor v3 have an edge to v5.
After this deletion, the preferences become v1v5v⊥ ≺ v1v3v⊥ ≺ v1v2v5v⊥. Finally, after the
deletion of the edge (v1, v5), the preferences become v1v3v⊥ ≺ v1v2v5v⊥.
The deletion of a state therefore consists in squeezing each path of length 2 around it in
a single edge. In the example, the deletion of the state v4 consists in squeezing the paths
v1v4v5 in the edge v1v5, and the same for v2v4v5 and v3v4v5 in the edges v2v5 and v3v5
respectively. The condition (u, v′) /∈ E makes sure that this squeezing is not perturbed
by the presence of an incident edge (u, v′) that could have contradictory preferences. For
instance, in the previous example, we cannot remove vertex v2 in the minor obtained before
having removed edge (v1, v5): otherwise, we would obtain as preferences for the owner of v1
the chain v1v5v⊥ ≺ v1v3v⊥ ≺ v1v5v⊥ which is not possible.
We can link termination of dynamics on graph games to the presence of minors, in the
various dynamics introduced before: if we manage to find a game minor where the dynamics
does not terminate, then the original game does not terminate either.
I Theorem 8. Let G be a game, and G′ be a minor of G. If → ∈ { 1−→, P1−→, PC−−→}, then G〈→〉
simulates G′〈→〉. In particular, via Proposition 4, if the dynamics → terminates for G, then
it terminates for G′ too.
Sketch of proof. We prove the result for 1−→ ; the two other cases are similar. Since sim-
ulations are transitive relations, it is sufficient to only consider that G′ has been obtained
from G either by deleting a single edge, or by deleting a single node. Let us briefly detail
the case where G′ is obtained by the deletion of a state v. If h ∈ Hist(G) \ {h | last(h) = v},
we can construct a corresponding play f(h) of G′ by replacing a sequence uvv′ of h by
uv′. The conditions over the deletion of v implies that that f is indeed a bijection from
Hist(G) \ {h | last(h) = v} to Hist(G′). We then consider the following relation on strategy
profiles: σ′ v σ if for all histories h ∈ Hist(G)\{h | last(h) = v}, σ′(f(h)) = σ(h) if σ(h) 6= v,
and σ′(f(h)) = v′ otherwise; and show that v is a simulation (indeed a bisimulation). J
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Notice that Theorem 8 suffers from three weaknesses. First, it does not hold for the best
reply dynamics bP1−−→ and bPC−−→, as shown by the following example. Consider again the game
GDIS from Example 1. Further, consider the game G in Figure 3 obtained from GDIS by adding
a third player, who owns a single node v3, such that the only edges to and from v3 are (v1, v3)
and (v3, v⊥), and where the preferences of player 1 are now v1v⊥ ≺1 v1v2v⊥ ≺1 v1v3v⊥
(observe that now, he prefers a path that traverses the new node v3 above all other paths).
Clearly, GDIS is a minor of G. Using Theorem 8, and since we know that GDIS〈 PC−−→〉 does
not terminate, we deduce that G〈 PC−−→〉 does not terminate either. Moreover, in this example,
GDIS〈 PC−−→〉 = GDIS〈 bPC−−→〉, so even with the best-response property, the dynamics does not
terminate in the minor. However, one can check that G〈 bPC−−→〉 terminates thanks to the
best-response property: Player 1 will not try to obtain path v1v2v⊥ (which leads to a cycle
in GDIS〈 PC−−→〉), but will choose a strategy going to v3 (see Figure 3, Right). So, GDIS is a
minor of G, s.t. bPC−−→ terminates for GDIS but not in G. The example can be adapted to bP1−−→.
A second weakness is that Theorem 8 does not apply to fair termination: the dynamics
→ could fairly terminate for the game G, but not for his minor G′. This could be the case if
we remove every choice (except one) for a certain player in the minor G′ creating a fair cycle
in G′ that would not be present in G.
Finally, the reciprocal of Theorem 8 does not hold: all dynamics terminate on the trivial
graph with a single state, but it is also minor of all games, including those where the dynamics
does not terminate.
This motivates the introduction of a stronger notion of graph minor, where it is allowed to
remove only the so-called dominated edges. Formally, let G be a game, let v ∈ Vi be a state,
and let e1 = (v, v1) and e2 = (v, v2) be two outgoing edges of v. We say that e1 is dominated
by e2 if for all positional strategies1 σ ∈ ΣP, Outcome (σ1, v) ≺i Outcome (σ2, v), where σ1
and σ2 coincide with σ except that σ1(v) = v1 and σ2(v) = v2. Intuitively, this means that
the player always prefers e2 to e1. Then, a game G′ is said to be a dominant minor of G if
it can be obtained from G by deleting states as before, but only deleting dominated edges.
Equipped with this notion, we overcome the three limitations of Theorem 8 we had identified:
I Theorem 9. Let G be a game and G′ be a dominant minor of G. If → ∈ { bP1−−→, bPC−−→}, then
we can build a simulation v of G′〈→〉 by G〈→〉 such that: (i) v−1 is a partial simulation of
G〈→〉 by G′〈→〉; and (ii) if there is a fair cycle in G then there is a fair cycle in G′.
In particular, the dynamics → fairly terminates for G if and only if it does for G′.
Now, Theorem 9 has some limitations too. We can show that it does not hold for
the ‘non-best-reply dynamics’ P1−→ and PC−−→. Moreover, even when we consider best-reply
dynamics, the fairness condition remains crucial: we can exhibit (see [1]) a case where there
is a (non-fair) cycle in G but no cycles in G′.
5 Applications to interdomain routing convergence
As explained in the introduction, the Border Gateway Protocol (BGP) is the de facto standard
interdomain routing protocol. Its role is to establish routes to all the networks that compose
the Internet. BGP does this by growing a routing tree towards every destination network
in a distributed manner, as follows. In the initial state, only the router in the destination
1 We restrict our definition to the context of positional strategies, for the sake of brevity, but it can be
extended to the more general setting.
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network has a route towards itself that it advertises to its neighbours. Each time a router
receives an advertisement, it selects among the neighbour routes the one it considers best
and then advertises it to its neighbours. The process repeats until no router wants to change
its best route. To select its best route, a router first filters the received routes to retain only
permitted ones and ranks them according to its preference. Both the filtering and ranking of
routes by a router are decided based on the network’s routing policy. For example, a route
can be preferred over another because it offers better performance or costs less and it can be
filtered out because it is not economically viable.
As shown in the introductory example, the routing approach at the heart of BGP
has known convergence issues. It could fail to reach an equilibrium, entering a persistent
oscillatory behaviour or it could have no equilibrium at all. This is a well-studied problem
that has led to considerable work [7, 6, 5, 15, 3, 4, 8, 12]. In their seminal work [7], Griffin
et al. analysed the BGP convergence properties using a simplified model named the Stable
Path Problem (SPP). The main questions they ask are the following: (1) whether an SPP
instance is Solvable, i.e., whether it admits a stable state; (2) whether the stable state is
Unique; and (3) whether the system is Safe, i.e. it always converges to a stable state.
They also give a sufficient condition for an SPP instance to be safe: the absence of
a substructure named a Dispute Wheel. Later, Sami et al. [15] have shown that the
existence of multiple stable states is a sufficient condition to prevent safety (i.e. Safe =⇒
Unique). These results have later been refined by Cittadini et al. [3]. While the works just
cited focus on the definition of sufficient conditions for safety, another approach by Gao and
Rexford [6] achieves convergence by enforcing only local conditions on route preferences.
In this section, we show how SPP can be expressed in our n-player game model, therefore
Safety reduces to checking for termination of the game dynamics. We revisit the result of
Sami et al. by providing a new proof that relies on our framework. Then, we further exploit
this framework to obtain a new result about SPP: we provide a necessary and sufficient
condition for safety in a setting which is more restricted (yet still realistic) than in [7].
One target games. We first translate the SPP, as a combination of: (1) a reachability game
that models the network topology and routing policies; and (2) the best-reply positional
concurrent dynamics that models the asynchronous behaviour of the routing protocol.
Using this approach, the routing safety problem translates to a dynamics termination
problem.
We rely on a particular class of games, that we call one target games (1TG for short):
they have a unique target, the destination network, that all players want to reach. Each
player corresponds to a network in the Internet and as such owns a single state. The routing
policies of networks are modelled by the preference relations and by the distinction between
permitted and forbidden paths. The preferences are only over positional strategies (paths),
meaning that each network picks its next-hop independently of its predecessors. Permitted
and forbidden paths model the fact that only some paths are allowed by the networks routing
policies. Forbidden paths are also used to take into account additional restrictions that
cannot be directly modelled. In SPP, the paths are simple (no loops); and non-simple paths
are forbidden, for obvious reasons of efficiency. Moreover, in SPP, if at some point a network
reaches a forbidden path, he will inform his neighbours that he is not able to reach the target.
To model this, we impose a requirement that that if a path is permitted, all its suffixes are
also permitted.
Formally, let G = (V,E, (Vi)1≤i≤n, (i)1≤i≤n) be an n-player game. For all 1 ≤ i ≤ n,
we assume that Pi is the set of permitted paths of player i. All these paths are finite paths of
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the form vi · · · v⊥ ∈ Pi. We denote by Pci the set of forbidden paths, i.e. all the positional
plays starting in vi that are not in Pi (in particular, all infinite paths are forbidden). We let
P = ⋃1≤i≤n Pi and Pc = ⋃1≤i≤n Pci . Then, G is a one target game (1TG) if:
V⊥ = {v⊥}, and, for all players i: Vi = {vi};
for all pi1 ∈ Pci , for all pi2 ∈ Pi: pi1 ≺i pi2 (permitted is better than forbidden);
for all pi1, pi2 ∈ Pci : pi1 ∼i pi2 (all forbidden paths are equivalent);
for all pi1, pi2 ∈ Pi: pi1 ∼i pi2 implies that then there are v ∈ V and pi1, pi2 s.t. pi1 = vivpi1
and pi2 = vivpi2 (if two permitted paths are equivalent, they have the same next-hop);
for all pi ∈ Pi, for all suffixes pi of pi: pi ∈ P (all suffixes of permitted paths are permitted).
Our running example (Figure 1) is a 1TG. Since, in such a game, each player owns one
and only one state, we will abuse notation by confusing each state v ∈ V with its player. For
example, for v ∈ Vi, we will write ≺v instead of ≺i.
Sami et al : Termination implies a unique terminal node. Equipped with this definition,
we start by revisiting a result of Sami et al. saying that when an instance of SPP is safe, the
solution is unique. In our setting, this translates as follows:
I Theorem 10. Let G be a 1TG. If bPC−−→ fairly terminates for G (i.e. the corresponding
instance of SPP is safe), then it has exactly one equilibrium.
We (re-)prove this result in our setting. We rely on the notion of L-fair path that we
define now. For a labelled graph G = (V,E,L), we write v1 →a v2 iff L(v1, v2) = a (for
v1, v2 ∈ V ). We further write v1 →A v2 with A = a1 · · · an iff v1 →a1 · · · →an v2. Then, a
path pi = v1v2 · · · is L-fair if all labels occur infinitely often in this path, i.e. for all a ∈ L,
for all k ≥ 1, ∃k′ ≥ k such that L(vk′ , vk′+1) = a. A cycle pi is called constant if there exists
a state v such that pi = vω. Moreover, a node is a sink if its only outgoing edges are self
loops. Then, we can show the following technical lemma:
I Lemma 11. Let G = (V,E, L) be a finite complete deterministic labelled graph satisfying:
for all v ∈ V , for all a, b ∈ L, there are A,B ∈ L∗ and v˜ ∈ V such that v →aA v˜ and
v →baB v˜. If there exists a state from which we can reach two different sinks, then G has a
non constant L-fair cycle.
Thanks to this result, we can establish Theorem 10. We prove the contrapositive, as
follows. We assume that G〈 bPC−−→〉 has more than one equilibrium. We introduce a new
dynamics (taking into account the beliefs of the players about the other players’ strategies)
and we use Lemma 11, to show that G〈 〉 has an L-fair cycle. Then, we define a partial
simulation v of G〈 〉 by G〈 bPC−−→〉 and use Proposition 5 to conclude that G〈 bPC−−→〉 has a
cycle, which is fair. Hence, bPC−−→ does not fairly terminate.
Griffin et al : Dispute wheels. Another classical notion in the BGP literature is that of a
dispute wheel (DW for short), defined by Griffin et al. [7] as a “circular set of conflicting
rankings between nodes”. They have shown that the absence of a DW is a sufficient condition
for safety, which is of course of major practical interest to prove that BGP will converge in a
given network. Moreover, a DW is an instance of a forbidden pattern in a game, and we will
thus apply the results from Section 4.
We start by formally defining a DW. Let G = (V,E, (Vi)1≤i≤n, (i)1≤i≤n) be a 1TG with
Pi the set of permitted paths of vi. A triple D = (U,P,H) is a DW of G if:
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(i) U = (u1, . . . , uk) ∈ V k is a tuple of states; (ii) P = (pi1, . . . , pik) is a tuple of permitted
paths such that for all 1 ≤ i ≤ k: pii ∈ Pui , i.e., pii is a permitted path starting in ui
; (iii) H = (h1, . . . , hk) is a tuple of non-maximal paths such that for all 1 ≤ i ≤ k:
hipi(i mod k)+1 ∈ Pui ; and (iv) for all 1 ≤ i ≤ k: pii ≺ui hipi(i mod k)+1.
Intuitively, in a DW, all players ui (for i = 1, . . . , k) can chose between two paths to v⊥:
either a ‘direct’ path pii, or an ‘indirect’ path hipi(i mod k)+1, which traverses u(i mod k)+1;
and where the latter is always preferred. So u1 prefers to reach through u2, u2 through u3,
and so on until uk who prefers to reach through u1. Such a conflict clearly yields loops where
the target is never reached. The game in Figure 1 is a typical example of game that has a
DW, if we let U = (v1, v2), P = (v1v⊥, v2v⊥) and H = (v1, v2). Indeed, v1v⊥ ≺1 v1v2v⊥ and
v2v⊥ ≺2 v2v1v⊥. Then, in our setting the sufficient condition of Griffin et al. [7] becomes:
I Theorem 12 ([7]). Let G be a 1TG. If G has no DW then bPC−−→ fairly terminates for G.
New result: strong dispute wheels for a necessary condition It is well-known, however,
that the absence of a DW is not necessary (see for example Figure 3 for a game that has a
DW but where bPC−−→ terminates). As far as we know, finding a unique and necessary condition
for the fair termination of bPC−−→ in 1TGs is still an open problem.
Relying on our framework, we manage to obtain such a necessary and sufficient condition
in a restricted setting. We first strengthen the definition of DW by introducing the notion of
strong dispute wheel (SDW for short). We then obtain two original (as far as we know) results
regarding SDW. First, the absence of SDW is a necessary condition for the termination of
PC−−→ (i.e. we drop the best-reply and the fairness hypothesis). Second, the absence of an SDW
is also a sufficient condition in the restricted setting where the preferences of the players
range only on their next-hop. This means for example that u1 prefers to reach the target
through u2 rather than through u3, but does not mind the route u2 uses (as long as v⊥ is
reached). While this is a restriction, we believe that it is still meaningful in practice, since
networks usually have little control about the routes chosen by their neighbours.
We first define the notion of SDW. Let G be a 1TG and D = (U,P,H) be a DW of G.
Then, D is a strong dispute wheel (SDW) of G if:
1. for all 1 ≤ i ≤ k: all states ui ∈ U occur only in pii, hi and hi−1 (we identify h0 with hk)
and not in the other paths of P and H; and
2. for all pii, pij ∈ P , for all hk, h` ∈ H with k 6= `: pii, hk and h` share no states of V \ U ,
and if pii and pij share a state v of V \ U then pii and pij have the same suffix after v.
An important property of this definition is that, whenever a game G contains an SDW
D = (U,P,H), we can extract a minor G′ which is essentially an SDW restricted to the states
of U (formally, G′ contains an SDW D′ = (U ′, P ′, H ′) where U ′ = U is the set of states of
G′). We do so by first deleting from G all edges that do not occur in P and H; then all
v 6∈ U (which have at most one outgoing edge at this point), using the procedure described
in Section 4. Note that the two extra conditions in the definition of an SDW guarantee that
the deletion of all the states v 6∈ U can occur.
I Theorem 13. Let G be a 1TG. If PC−−→ terminates for G, then G has no SDW.
Proof. By Theorem 8, it is sufficient to prove that the dynamics PC−−→ does not terminate
in the minor game G′ extracted from the SDW (see above). We let, for all 1 ≤ i ≤ k,
σ1(ui) = u(i mod k)+1, and σ2(ui) = v⊥. Since the path resulting from σ1 does not visit v⊥,
by definition of an SDW, we have σ1
PC−−→ σ2 PC−−→ σ1. Hence G′〈 PC−−→〉 contains a cycle. J
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bPC−−→ does not fairly
terminate for G
PC−−→ does not fairly
terminate for G
PC−−→ does not
terminate for G
G has a DW G has a DW+ G has an SDW
Thm 12 [7] [7] Thm 13
Thm 14
Figure 4 Relationship between SDW and prior results: dashed arrow only holds for N1TG.
Thus, the absence of an SDW is a necessary condition for the termination of PC−−→. We can
further show that this condition is sufficient in the restricted case where any two (permitted)
paths that have the same next-hop are equivalent. Formally, let G be a 1TG. We say that it
is a neighbour one target game (N1TG for short) if for all players i, for all permitted paths
pi1, pi2 ∈ Pi of player i: pi1 = vivpi′1 and pi2 = vivpi′2 implies that pi1 ∼i pi2. Then, we can show
the following, relying on Theorem 13 (and thus, also on Theorem 8):
I Theorem 14. Let G be a N1TG. Then, PC−−→ does not fairly terminate for G if and only if
G has an SDW.
Sketch of proof. In [7], Griffin et al. prove a stronger result than Theorem 12, showing that
if G〈 PC−−→〉 has a fair cycle, then G has a DW satisfying the following additional properties:
(1) for all ui ∈ U : j 6= i implies ui /∈ pij ; (2) for all v /∈ U , for all i, j: v /∈ pii ∩ hj ; and (3) for
all v ∈ pii ∩ pij : pii(v) = pij(v).
We call DW+ such DW. Then, the general schema of our proof is summarised in Figure 4:
first, we show that the existence of a DW+ implies an SDW by showing the required
additional properties. By Theorem 13, this implies G〈 PC−−→〉 has a cycle. Then, we conclude
by showing that this implies the existence of a fair cycle. J
Finding an SDW in practice Because of the intricate definition of SDW, finding an SDW
in a real network may be challenging in practice. However, we have:
I Proposition 15. Let G be an N1TG. Then PC−−→ does not fairly terminate for G if and only
if GDIS is a minor of G.
6 Perspectives
We envision multiple directions of future work. First, we could consider games with imperfect
information. In the application to interdomain routing for example, this could be used to
model a malicious router that advertises lies to selected neighbours. Advertising a non-
existent or non-feasible path would allow for example an attacker to attract the packets of
an opponent’s network. Second, we could investigate a better way to model asynchronicity
(useful for the routing problem) than the concurrent dynamics we have studied here. Third,
we chose to model fairness via a qualitative property which ensures that all the players will
eventually have the opportunity to update their strategies if they want to. An alternative way
could be the use of probabilities: indeed, there are games for which a dynamics → does not
fairly terminate, but where an equilibrium is reached almost surely when interpreting G〈→〉
as a finite Markov chain (with uniform distributions). Finally, we could apply the dynamics
of graph-based games to other problems than interdomain routing, like load sensitive routing.
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A Appendix to Section 4
A.1 Missing proofs
Proof of Theorem 8. Let G be a game, G′ be a minor of G and → ∈ { 1−→, P1−→, PC−−→}. We
have to prove that G〈→〉 simulates G′〈→〉.
Since simulations are preorders, they are transitive relations (if G simulates G′ and
G′ simulates G′′, then G simulates G′′). Therefore, as G′ has been obtain from G by a
(finite) sequence of deletion of edges and nodes, we let G = G0,G1, . . . ,Gk = G′ such that
∀1 ≤ i ≤ k, Gi+1 is a minor of Gi obtain from Gi either by deleting a single edge, or by
deleting a single state. If we prove that, ∀1 ≤ i ≤ k, Gi〈→〉 simulates Gi+1〈→〉 we would
have proven our result by transitivity.
Then, it is sufficient to only consider that G′ has been obtained from G either by deleting
a single edge, or by deleting a single state.
First, let us consider the case where G′ is obtained by the deletion of an edge e0. For
the dynamics 1−→, we define a relation v, subset of Σ(G′)× Σ(G), by letting σ′ v σ if for all
histories h ∈ Hist(G′) (i.e. h does not go through e0), we have σ(h) = σ′(h). This relation has
Σ(G′) as a domain. We are going to show that this is a simulation relation. To do so, consider
σ′ and τ ′ in Σ(G′) such that σ′ 1−→ τ ′, and a strategy σ ∈ Σ(G) such that σ′ v σ. Let τ ∈ Σ(G)
be defined for a history h of G by τ(h) = τ ′(h) if h ∈ Hist(G′), and τ(h) = σ(h) otherwise.
We must prove that σ 1−→ τ . Let h′ ∈ Hist(G′) be the history s.t. (1) σ′(h′) 6= τ ′(h′); and
(2) for all histories h ∈ Hist(G′) \ {h′}: σ′(h) = τ ′(h). Such a history h′ exists since σ′ 1−→ τ ′.
Moreover, if i = player(h′), then Outcome (σ′, h′) ≺i Outcome (τ ′, h′), again because σ′ 1−→ τ ′.
Then, we have τ(h′) = τ ′(h′) 6= σ′(h′) = σ(h′). Moreover, for all h ∈ Hist(G) \ {h′}, if
h /∈ Hist(G′) then τ(h) = σ(h) by definition, and otherwise τ(h) = τ ′(h) = σ′(h) = σ(h).
Therefore, Outcome (σ, h′) ≺i Outcome (τ, h′), so that σ 1−→ τ . We thus have proved that
G′〈 1−→〉 v G〈 1−→〉.
The same kind of reasoning can be made for P1−→ and PC−−→. The situation is easier in the
case of positional strategies, since G and G′ have the same set of states (as we have assumed
we have only deleted an edge). Let v, subset of ΣP(G′) × ΣP(G) be such that σ′ v σ if
∀v ∈ V, σ′(v) = σ(v) (note that, although σ and σ′ take the same decisions in the same
states, they are, formally, different objects. Indeed, they map histories, which are different in
G and G′, to states). This relation has ΣP(G′) as domain, and for all σ′ ∈ ΣP(G′) there is one
and only one σ ∈ ΣP(G) such that σ′ v σ. We are going to show that this is a simulation
relation. To do so, consider σ′ and τ ′ in ΣP(G′) such that σ′ P1−→ τ ′ (resp. σ′ PC−−→ τ ′), and a
strategy σ ∈ ΣP(G) such that σ′ v σ. Let τ ∈ ΣP(G) be the (unique) strategy profile such
that τ ′ v τ . By definition of P1−→ (resp., PC−−→) and v, we have σ P1−→ τ (resp., σ PC−−→ τ).
Second, consider the case where G′ is obtained by the deletion of a state v. If v is an
isolated node, the result is trivially true as G〈→〉 = G′〈→〉. Then, we suppose that v is not
an isolated node. By definition of minor, it means that v has a unique outgoing edge (v, v′)
and all predecessors u of v do not have v′ as a successor.
For the dynamics 1−→, if h ∈ Hist(G) such that last(h) 6= v, we can construct a correspond-
ing play f(h) of G′ by replacing a sequence uvv′ of h by uv′. Notice that f is a bijection
from Hist(G) \ {h | last(h) = v} to Hist(G′), by the conditions over the deletion of v in the
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definition of minors. Then, the relation on strategy profiles is given by σ′ v σ if:
for all h ∈ Hist(G) \ {h | last(h) = v} : σ′(f(h)) =
{
σ(h) if σ(h) 6= v
σ′(f(h)) = v′ otherwise.
Since f is bijective and since, for all σ and h: last(h) = v implies σ(h) = v′; then the relation
v is also a bijection. This enables us to prove as before that it is a simulation relation
(indeed even a bisimulation relation), so that v is a simulation relation of G′〈 1−→〉 by G〈 1−→〉,
in that case too.
We can make the same reasoning for P1−→ and PC−−→. Let v, subset of ΣP(G′)×ΣP(G) such
that σ′ v σ if:
for all u ∈ V \ {v} : σ′(u) =
{
σ(u) if σ(u) 6= v
v′ if σ(u) = v.
It is clear that this relation is a bisimulation between G′〈 P1−→〉 and G〈 P1−→〉 (resp. G′〈 PC−−→〉 and
G〈 PC−−→〉). J
Proof of Theorem 9. Let G be a game, G′ be a dominant minor of G and → ∈ { bP1−−→, bPC−−→}.
We have to prove that we can build a simulation v of G′〈→〉 by G〈→〉 such that: (i) v−1 is a
partial simulation of G〈→〉 by G′〈→〉; and (ii) if there is a fair cycle in G then there is a fair
cycle in G′. In particular, the dynamics → fairly terminates for G if and only if it does for G′.
We follow the same proof as in Theorem 8. We have already seen that if G′ is obtained
by the deletion of a state, then G and G′ are bisimilar, and we can show easily that a fair
cycle in G〈→〉 implies the existence of a fair cycle in G′〈→〉.
If G′ is obtained by the deletion of a dominated edge e0, then we construct the same
simulation relation v as before (in the cases P1−→ and PC−−→), i.e. σ′ v σ if ∀v ∈ V : σ′(v) = σ(v).
This is still a simulation relation, even with the best-reply dynamics, since we remove a
dominated edge. We can also show similarly that v−1 is a partial simulation, by using once
again that a change of profile towards e0 is not possible since it is dominated. If there is a
fair cycle in G′〈→〉 then the simulation gives a cycle in G〈→〉: this is also a fair cycle since
the edge e0 is dominated and thus cannot be the unique cause of non-fairness. Reciprocally,
the partial simulation v−1 allows one to reconstruct from a fair cycle in G〈→〉 a cycle in
G′〈→〉: if this cycle is not fair, this means that the edge e0 is chosen infinitely often in the
cycle of G, which violates the best-reply condition of the dynamics → in G. J
A.2 Examples related to Theorem 8 and Theorem 9
As seen in example Figure 3, Theorem 8, does not works for bPC−−→ and bP1−−→.
Figure 5 shows why Theorem 8 does not work with fair termination (instead of termination).
The game G on the left of the figure is a 3-player game, where Player i owns state vi (for
i = 1, 2, 3), and where the players’ preferences are as follows:
v1v⊥ ≺1 v1v2v⊥;
v2v⊥ ≺2 v2v3v1v⊥; and
Player 3 prefers v3v⊥ to all other paths.
Clearly, GDIS (Figure 1) is a minor of G. We already know (Figure 1 again) that GDIS〈 PC−−→〉
admits a fair cycle, so, if Theorem 9 were to hold on PC−−→, G〈 PC−−→〉 should admit a fair cycle
too. Let us explain why it is not the case. The graph G〈 PC−−→〉 is sketched on the right-hand
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v1 v2
v⊥
v3
c1
c2c3
s1 s2
s3
c1c2c3 s1c2c3
c1s2c3 s1s2c3
c1c2s3 s1c2s3
c1s2s3 s1s2s3
Figure 5 Left: a 3-player game G with GDIS (Figure 1) as a minor. Right: G〈 PC−→〉 with a non-fair
cycle.
v4 v⊥
v1
v2
v3
e
f
Figure 6 A game G where G〈 PC−→〉 does not terminate. When removing the edge e (which is
dominated by f), we obtain a new game G′ which is a dominant minor of this game, in which G′〈 PC−→〉
terminates.
side of Figure 5. All the nodes in the left gray boxes are those where Player 3 plays c3, and
those in the right box are where he plays s3. Several edges are not drawn for clarity: they
are all the edges where Player 3 changes from c3 to s3. Given his preferences, he will always
choose to do so if he decides to update his strategy, so there is an implicit edge from c1c2c3
to c1c2s3, but also one from c1c2c3 to c1s2s3 for example. Then, as soon as Player 3 has
decided to play s3, the other two players will both prefer to play s1 and s2 respectively. As
a consequence, the only cycle is (c1c2c3, s1s2c3)ω, where Player 3 never plays although he
could. This cycle is not fair. Hence, G〈 PC−−→〉 admits no fair cycle.
Finally, we exhibit a third example of a game G in which G〈 PC−−→〉 does not terminate, and
from which we can extract a dominant minor G′ s.t. G′〈 PC−−→〉 terminates. This shows why
Theorem 9 does not hold anymore when the ‘best reply’ hypothesis is dropped. This game is
showed in Figure 6, with the following preferences for the players:
v1v2v3v⊥ ≺1 v1v⊥ ≺1 v1v4v⊥ ≺1 v1v2v⊥;
v2v3v1v4v⊥ ≺2 v2v⊥ ≺2 v2v3v1v⊥ ≺2 v2v3v⊥;
v3v1v4v⊥ ≺3 v3v1v2v⊥ ≺3 v3v⊥ ≺3 v3v1v⊥.
Then, one can check that the following sequence of (positional) strategy profiles forms a
cycle for PC−−→ (but not for bPC−−→). Note that we do not indicate σ4 which is always equal to
v⊥, and we write in bold the change from the previous profile:
1. σ1 = v2, σ2 = v⊥, and σ3 = v⊥;
2. σ1 = v2, σ2 = v3 , and σ3 = v⊥;
3. σ1 = v⊥ , σ2 = v3, and σ3 = v⊥;
4. σ1 = v⊥, σ2 = v3, and σ3 = v1 ;
5. σ1 = v4 , σ2 = v3, and σ3 = v1;
6. σ1 = v4, σ2 = v⊥ , and σ3 = v1;
7. σ1 = v4, σ2 = v⊥, and σ3 = v⊥ ;
8. σ1 = v2 , σ2 = v⊥, and σ3 = v⊥;
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However, when removing from G the edge e (which is dominated by f), one obtains a
new game G′ that is a dominant minor of G and in which the PC−−→ terminates.
B Appendix to Section 5
B.1 Termination implies a unique equilibrium
Proof of Lemma 11. Let G = (V,E,L) be a finite complete deterministic labelled graph
satisfying: for all v ∈ V , for all a, b ∈ L, there are A,B ∈ L∗ and v˜ ∈ V such that v aA→ v˜
and v baB→ v˜, and such that there exists a state from which we can reach two different sinks.
We have to prove that G has a non constant L-fair cycle.
Let {t1, . . . tk} be the set of sinks. Given ti a sink, we define Ti as the set of states from
which all paths lead to ti, i.e.
Ti = {v ∈ V | ∀w ∈ V, (v, w) ∈ E, implies that w ∈ Ti and there is a path from v to ti}.
Let T0 = V \ (T1 ∪ . . . ∪ Tk). By hypothesis, T0 6= ∅.
Let L = (l1, . . . , lk) and let v0 ∈ T0. From v0, we define pi = v0, v1, . . . such that
∀i ≥ 0, vi
l(i+1) mod k−→ vi+1. As G is finite, pi is a lasso, ie ∃pi1, pi2 finite paths such that
pi = pi1piω2 . In particular, let pi′ = piω2 be a cycle. Moreover, pi is L-fair by construction, then
so is pi′. Two possibilities : either pi′ is not constant, and the Lemma is then satisfies as we
have found a non constant L-fair cycle in G; or pi′ is contant, which means that pi2 = ti for
some i. In this case, v0 has a path to some ti.
To conclude the proof, we just have to consider the case when every v ∈ T0 has a path to
some ti.
Moreover, for v ∈ T0, if v cannot reach any other tj , it means that v ∈ Ti, by definition of
Ti. Then we can suppose that from every v ∈ T0, we can reach at least two terminal states.
In order to prove that there is a non constant L-fair cycle in G, we just have to prove
that, from any v ∈ T0, there exists a L-fair path that stays in T0, i.e. ∀v ∈ T0, ∃A such that
if ∀a ∈ L: a ∈ A and v A→ v′ ∈ T0. In fact, it is sufficient to prove that ∀v ∈ T0, ∀a ∈ L,
∃A such that a ∈ A and such that v A→ v′ ∈ T0. The proof of this equivalence is made by
iteration and is left to the reader.
Towards a contradiction, let us assume that ∃v ∈ T0, ∃a ∈ L s.t. ∀A: if a ∈ A, then
v
A→ v′ /∈ T0. In particular, v a→ v1 ∈ Ti with i 6= 0. Notice that this path exists because the
graph is complete, and is unique because the graph is deterministic. As v ∈ T0, it means that
exists a path to tj with j 6= 0 and j 6= i. Let v → v1 → . . .→ vk with vk−1 ∈ T0 and vk ∈ Tj .
∀l ∈ {1, . . . , k − 1}, let sl such that vl a→ sl. By hypothesis, sl /∈ T0 (otherwise there exists a
path from v and containing a that leads to some v′ ∈ T0). Then let ` be such that s` ∈ Ti′
and s`+1 ∈ Tj′ such that i′ 6= j′; and let us assume that v` b→ v`+1. By hypothesis, there are
A, B and v∗ such that:
v`
a→ s` A→ v∗ with v∗ ∈ Ti′ (the latter holds since s` ∈ Ti′); and
v`
b→ v`+1 a→ s`+1 B→ v∗ with v∗ ∈ Tj′ (the latter holds since s`+1 ∈ Tj′).
This leads to a contradiction as Ti′ ∩ Tj′ = ∅. This situation is modelled by Figure 7
J
Proof of Theorem 10. Let G be a 1TG such that bPC−−→ fairly terminates for G (i.e. the
corresponding instance of SPP is safe). We have to prove that G has exactly one equilibrium.
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v v` v`+1 vk
s` s`+13 ∈Ti′ Tj′
b
a a
v∗
A B
3 ∈Ti′ Tj′
Figure 7 Construction of the contradiction in the case of Lemma11
We prove the contrapositive of the theorem, i.e. we assume that G has more than one
equilibrium, and we deduce that G〈 bPC−−→〉 has a fair cycle.
To prove that G〈 bPC−−→〉 has a fair cycle, we proceed in two steps. First, we introduce a
new dynamics  and prove, by means of Lemma 11, that G〈 〉 has a non constant L-fair
cycle. Then, we define a partial simulation v of G〈 bPC−−→〉 by G〈 〉 and use Proposition 5 to
conclude that G〈 bPC−−→〉 has a cycle. Finally, we show that this cycle is fair.
The new dynamics we consider takes explicitly into account the fact that, when a player
updates its strategy, it might take some time for the other players to be notified. Hence, each
state in this new dynamics stores what each Player j believes about the current strategy of
all Player i. Formally, let G〈 〉 = (V, , L) be the labelled graph defined as follows.
the set of states V contains all states v of the form v = (σi,j)1≤i,j≤n, i.e. a state associated
a strategy σi,j to each pair of players i and j. Intuitively, σi,j represents what Player
j believes about the current strategy of Player i. In other words, for all 1 ≤ j ≤ n,
σj = (σi,j)1≤i≤n represents the belief of the player j about the strategies of the other
players. In particular, σj,j is the current strategy of player j. We let
V0 = {v ∈ V | ∀1 ≤ j, j′ ≤ n : (σi,j)1≤i≤n = (σi,j′)1≤i≤n}
be the set of states where every player knows the strategies of the other players;
L = {0, 1, . . . , n}, where 1, . . . , n represents the players; and
v
` v′ iff:
Either ` = 0, then v′ ∈ V0 and for all 1 ≤ j ≤ n,: σj,j = σ′j,j . The 0 change is an
update of knowledge. All players learn the strategies of the other players. Notice that
if v ∈ V0, then v 0 v.
Or ` 6= 0, then for all j 6= `: (σi,j)1≤i≤n = (σ′i,j)1≤i≤n and the update of Player `
is performed according to P1−→ if possible. Formally, (σi,`)1≤i≤n P1−→ (σ′i,`)1≤i≤n with
σ`,` 6= σ′`,` if this is permitted by P1−→, or (σi,`)1≤i≤n = (σ′i,`)1≤i≤n otherwise. Such a
move in the dynamics thus corresponds to Player ` updating his strategy according to
P1−→ if possible, or no update at all if not. This change is not yet learned by the other
players.
I Example 16. See Figure 8 for a representation of a part of GDIS〈 〉. Every nodes of
GDIS〈 〉 are represented, but not every edges, for seeks of clarity.
For example, the node
s1 c2
c1 c2
represents the state where player 1 plays s1 and believes
that player 2 plays c2 (first line) and where player 2 plays c2 and believes that player 1 plays
c1 (second line).
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c1 c2
c1 c2
s1 c2
c1 c2
c1 c2
c1 s2
s1 c2
c1 s2
c1 c2
s1 c2
s1 c2
s1 c2
c1 c2
s1 s2
s1 c2
s1 s2
c1 s2
c1 c2
s1 s2
c1 c2
c1 s2
c1 s2
s1 s2
c1 s2
c1 s2
s1 c2
s1 s2
s1 c2
c1 s2
s1 s2
s1 s2
s1 s2
1
2
0
Figure 8 Representation of a part of GDIS〈 〉
The nodes of V0 are represented by the double circle, where we can see that all the
believes correspond to the real choice of the players.
Notice that, by definition, the graph is complete deterministic.
As an example, we considere the three updates possible from c1 c2
c1 c2
c1 c2
c1 c2
c1 c2
c1 c2
0 means that an update of knowledge will stay in the same state.
c1 c2
c1 c2
s1 c2
c1 c2
1 means that player 1 updates his strategy according to
P1−→,
changing c1 by s1, but player 2 has not been informed of this
change yet.
c1 c2
c1 c2
c1 c2
c1 s2
2 means that player 2 updates his strategy according to
P1−→,
changing c2 by s1, but player 1 has not been informed of this
change yet.
Moreover, notice that the sinks are
s1 c2
s1 c2
and
c1 s2
c1 s2
, which correspond in a certain
sense to the equilibria in GDIS〈 PC−−→〉.
The rest of the proof will be as follows:
1. We check that G〈 〉 verifies the conditions in Lemma 11, and then has a L-fair cycle;
2. We define a partial simulation v of G〈 +〉 by G〈 bPC−−→
+
〉 of domain V0;
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3. We deduce that G〈 +〉 has a cycle containing elements of V0;
4. Using Proposition 5, we deduce that G〈 bPC−−→
+
〉 has a cycle;
5. Then, we conclude that G〈 bPC−−→〉 has a fair cycle.
1. G〈 〉 is deterministic because the dynamics is Best Reply and the preferences are
strict for a different neighbour.
G〈 〉 is complete by definition.
For σ a terminal state of G, let v ∈ V0 such that v = (σi, j)1≤i,j≤n with σi,i = σi.
Then v is a sink of G〈 〉, as v 0 and σ is terminal for P1−→. Then, as G〈 P1−→〉 as several
terminal nodes, G〈 〉 has several sinks.
Let v ∈ V and let i, j ∈ L. We will show that ∃I, J and v∗ such that v iI v∗ and
v
jiJ v∗
If i = j, let I = J = ε. We have to prove that i = ii . Two cases are possible for i.
Either i = 0, which means a knowledges update, or i > 0, which means a player
update. In the first case, if i = 0, v 0 v∗ means that v∗ ∈ V0, by definition of 0 .
And as v∗ ∈ V0, v∗ 0 v∗, then v 0 v∗ 0 v∗, and then 0 = 0 0 . In the second
case, when i > 0, i represent the update of player i. As there is no other change
between the two i , (neither player or knowledge update), and because the updates
are best reply, it is clear that if v i v∗, then v∗ i v∗. Then, once again, i = i i .
If i = 0 and j 6= 0. Let I = ji and J = ji. Intuitively, jiji means that player j
changes his strategy, there is a knowledge update, then j changes again, then there
is a knowledge update. It is clear that if we remove the first change of j, the result
will be exactly the same, i.e. jiji =iji 
If j = 0 and i 6= 0. Let I = jij and J = j. This is symmetrical to the previous
point, then we have that ijij =jij .
If i 6= 0 and j 6= 0. Then let I = j and J = i. Since these updates are performed
without any knowledge update, it is clear that ij = ji .
We still have to prove that there exists v from which we can reach two different sinks.
Let τ ∈ ΣP and τ˜ ∈ ΣP two different equilibria of G〈 bPC−−→〉 and t = (τi,j)1≤i,j≤n, t˜ =
(τ˜i,j)1≤i,j≤n ∈ V0 the associated sinks of G〈 〉. Let v = (σi,j)1≤i,j≤n ∈ V such that
∀1 ≤ i ≤ n, σi,i = τi and ∀j 6= i, σi,j = τ˜i. In this state, all players play the first
equilibrium τ but believe that the other players play the second equilibrium τ˜ . Clearly,
v
0 t and v 1,...,n t˜. Then v can reachs two different sinks.
Then, by Lemma 11, G〈 〉 has a non constant L-fair cycle.
2. We define a partial simulation v of G〈 +〉 by G〈 bPC−−→
+
〉 of domain V0 as follows:
(σi,j)1≤i,j≤n v (τi)1≤i≤n if ∀j, (σi,j)1≤i≤n = (τi)1≤i≤n. The proof that v is a par-
tial simulation of G〈 +〉 by G〈 bPC−−→
+
〉 comes directly from the definition of bPC−−→ and  .
3. Clearly, if G〈 〉 has an L−fair cycle, it means that this cycle contains elements of V0,
by definition of 0 . Then G〈 +〉 contains a non constant cycle with only states of V0.
Intuitively, this means that the cycle visits states where all the Players are perfectly
informed about the strategies of all other players, which are the states that ‘corresponds’
to those in G〈 bPC−−→
+
〉.
4. By Proposition 5, it means that G〈 bPC−−→
+
〉 has a cycle.
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5. As the first cycle built in G〈 〉 was L-fair, it means that, during this cycle, every player
has changed his strategy, or at least has had the opportunity to change it. It means that,
in G〈 bPC−−→〉, the cycle is fair. J
Proof of Theorem 14. Let G be a N1TG. We have to prove that PC−−→ does not fairly
terminate for G if and only if G has an SDW.
In [7], Griffin et al. prove a stronger result than Theorem 12. Indeed, they actually prove
that if bPC−−→ fairly terminates for a 1TG G, then G has a DW such that:
1. ∀ui ∈ U, ui /∈ pij ∈ P, if j 6= i;
2. ∀v /∈ U, v /∈ pii ∩ hj , for pii ∈ P and hj ∈ H;
3. ∀v ∈ pii ∩ pij , pii(v) = pij(v).
We call such a dispute wheel a DW+. We show that if a game has a DW+, this implies the
existence of a SDW by showing the remaining properties:
4. ∀ui ∈ U, ui /∈ hj ∈ H, if j 6= i and j 6= i− 1.
5. ∀v /∈ U, v /∈ hi ∩ hj , for hi, hj ∈ H with i 6= j.
Moreover, Theorem 13 tells us that having an SDW implies that G〈 PC−−→〉 has a cycle. We
conclude the proof by showing that if G〈 PC−−→〉 has a cycle, it has a fair cycle, because if a
player which was not allowed to change during the non fair cycle decides to change, it will
not influence the choices of the other players, then the cycle remains.
Let us prove this :
If G has a DW+, then we can build a DW such that ∀ui ∈ U, ui /∈ hj ∈ H, if j 6= i and j 6=
i−1. On the contrary, let us suppose that ∃ui ∈ U such that ∃hj ∈ H with j 6= i−1; j 6= i
such that ui ∈ hj . It means that pij = ujpj . . . 0 ≺j ujrj . . . ui . . . uj+1pj+1 . . . 0 = hjpij+1.
By conditions over the preferences of the game, it means that, for h′j = ujrj . . . pi,
pij = ujpj . . . 0 ≺j ujrj . . . uipi . . . 0 = h′jpii. Let Π′ = (
−→
U ′, P ′, H ′) where −→U ′ =
u1, . . . , uj , ui, . . . , un ; P ′ = pi1, . . . , pij , pii, . . . , pin ; H ′ = h1, . . . h′jhi, . . . , hn. Notice
that this DW is still a DW+.
If G has a DW+ satisfying condition 4, then we can build a DW such that ∀v /∈ U, v /∈
hi ∩ hj , for hi, hj ∈ H with i 6= j. Suppose that ∃v /∈ −→U such that v ∈ hi ∪ hj .
Let hi = uiri . . . vvi . . . ui+1 and hj = ujrj . . . vvj . . . uj+1. In particular, as pij ≺j
ujrj . . . vvj . . . uj+1pj+1 . . . 0 = hjpij+1, by conditions over the preferences, it means that,
for h′j = ujrj . . . vvi . . . ui+1, then pij ≺j ujrj . . . vvi . . . ui+1pi+1 . . . 0 = hjpij+1 = h′jpii.
Let Π′ = (−→U ′, P ′,−→H ′) where−→
U ′ = u1, . . . , uj , ui+1, . . . , un ; P ′ = pi1, . . . , pij , pii+1, . . . , pin ; H ′ = h1, . . . h′jhi+1, . . . , hn.
Note that this DW is still a DW+ satisfying condition 4.
By iterating this process, we can build a Strong Dispute Wheel.
First of all, let σ1 → . . . → σn, a (not fair) cycle in G. Let us suppose that a player
i cannot change his strategy during this cycle. Let σ1,i the best reply of player i to
σ1. By hypothesis of Neighbour game, σ˜1 → σ˜n is a fair cycle, with ˜σj, i = σ1,i and
∀k 6= i, ˜σj, k = σj, k J
Proof of Proposition 15. By Theorem 14, if GDIS is a minor of G, then PC−−→ does not fairly
terminates for G. Moreover, still by Theorem 14, if PC−−→ does not fairly terminate, then it
means that G has an SDW. It remains to prove that if G has an SDW, G has GDIS as a minor.
Let D = (U,P,H) be the SDW of G with U = (u1, . . . , uk), P = (pi1, . . . , pik) and
H = (h1, . . . , hk). If k > 2, let D′ = ((u1, u2), (pi1, pi2), (h1, h′2)) with h′2 = h2h3 . . . hk. We
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do have that pi1 ≺1 h1pi2 and pi2 ≺2 h′2pi1 ∼2 h2pi3 because G is an N1TG. In particular,
GDIS is a minor of G. J
